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The last decade has seen digital technologies become ubiquitous and integrated into everyday life.  The 
Work spans eight years of this period and addresses several legal challenges, clashes and uncertainties 
that have arisen as a result, particularly in respect of the use of digital technologies by public sector bodies.  
In this thesis commentary, the Work is categorised by reference to three sub-themes: i) digital processing 
of information, legal conflicts and harms; ii) questions around data sharing and trust; iii) AI and algorithmic 
analysis in policing and the legal and policy framework.  The commentary discusses how the Work, as an 
integrated whole, represents an independent and original contribution to Cyberlaw and has championed 
and proven the value of an approach that is ‘interdisciplinary’ both within the legal field and outside of it.  
Digital technologies do not exist in a vacuum.  Research across legal and other boundaries, as 
demonstrated by the Work, is necessary to address the impact on interlocking legal, operational and policy 
systems, and therefore to support convincing recommendations for change.  Mixed-methodologies 
underpin the Work, combining doctrinal and law-in-context/law-in-action approaches with empirical 
research, historical and comparative methods, freedom of information request methods and/or participatory 
research, in order to deepen understanding of the issues identified and explored from different 
perspectives.  These methodologies, combined with interdisciplinary working, could be described as an ‘in-
house’ approach to legal research, defined by practical knowledge and understanding of an operational 
context, awareness of relevant legal frameworks, translation of theoretical concepts, and the independence 
of thought necessary for pragmatic conclusions and recommendations. The Work has informed further 
academic investigation, both by the author and others, and led to policy and operational developments.  
Various new avenues of research are suggested by Work as we continue to see misuses of the digital 
person, the siloing of knowledge by commercial bodies and the side-lining of the law in favour of en vogue 










Technological change has been the dominant underlying influence throughout my working life, an influence 
that is reflected in the publications (the Work) discussed in this Commentary.  In 1992, when I began my 
legal career as an Articled Clerk (the old name for a trainee solicitor), we were still living in an age of 
physical information.  I had no computer on my desk.  Instead, paper files dominated and I dictated my 
letters and documents onto a cassette via a hand-held Dictaphone.  These were typed by the secretaries 
using electronic typewriters or basic computers, printed, amended by hand and returned.  The lawyers did 
not take much notice of the computers.   
 
A year or so later, we all had computers.  Even for the traditional solicitors’ profession, email started to 
become the communication method of choice.  In the wider internet sphere, this period corresponded with 
coming online of eBay, myspace, Facebook and Amazon.com.  In 1997, Steve Jobs re-joined Apple Inc., 
signalling that company’s long term product strategy which would significantly influence the MP3 and digital 
device market.  Also in 1997, IBM’s supercomputer ‘Deep Blue’ beat world chess champion Garry 
Kasparov – genuine artificial intelligence at work or just brute force?  In 1998, as Google filed for 
incorporation in California, I followed Jobs to Apple becoming the company’s first UK in-house legal 
counsel.  In the same year, 3G was launched, paving the way for faster data-transmission and internet 
access, and thus the growth of the mobile phone as the ubiquitous communication device.  I was a late 
adopter of the mobile phone, despite my employment by technology companies, but by 2003, I was the 
proud owner of a Blackberry device with my emails following me wherever I went.  My subsequent 
employment within Government coincided with this time of change, when public bodies were having to 
come to terms with the changing nature of information and communications, and the implications for use, 
disclosure and analysis by the public sector.  Since then, we have witnessed a mobile revolution (a median 
of 76% of adults across 18 advanced economies were reported to have smartphones in 2018),1 coinciding 
with ‘Web 2.0’, a term used to describe websites that encourage user participation, such as social media 
and self-publishing sites and functionality including user commentary, ‘likes’ and ‘tagging’.   
 
The last decade - the time period spanned by the Work - has seen the steady rise of mobile connectivity, 
home broadband, streaming and digital services and social media use, with resultant concerns around 
digital tracking, data privacy, the ‘right to be forgotten’, surveillance (2013 marked the Snowdon revelations 
concerning NSA surveillance), digital harms, online abuse and misinformation. [1, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14]  ‘Artificial 
Intelligence’ (AI) became the new buzzword, although this term is a considerable misnomer disguising as it 
does the very human nature of the methods and calculations behind the technology (and the suspicion that 
much of it is old (statistical) wine in new bottles).  That being said, this period has seen considerable 
advancements in natural language processing and speech technology, facial recognition and algorithmic 
recommender and classification systems, underpinned by supervised and unsupervised machine learning 
methods, and the analysis and combination of digital information.  Led by the commercial sector,2 these 
technologies are now so integrated into our daily digital lives (in the form of search engines, online 
shopping recommendations, social media interactions, job candidate assessment, surveillance and security 
applications, ‘smart’ devices, ‘driver-assist’ tools and so on) that they have become almost invisible, 
sometimes leading to well publicised personal data abuses.3   The prospect that combining datasets will 
create hitherto unknown intelligence or knowledge, or create certainty where uncertainty previously existed, 
is an understandably attractive one: ‘A network of devices that can accurately give your location at any time 
of day, your eating habits, your energy consumption, your bank details, and your biometric data points has 
great potential when held by either corporations or governments.’4 
 
1 Laura Silver, ‘Smartphone Ownership Is Growing Rapidly Around the World, but Not Always Equally’ (Pew Research 
Center, Feb 5, 2019) https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/05/smartphone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-
around-the-world-but-not-always-equally/ accessed 4 October 2020. 
2 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Artificial Intelligence and Public Standards: A Review by the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life (February 2020). 
3 One of the most infamous being the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018.  






Where private sector developers lead, the public sector tends to follow, albeit more cautiously. Within 
policing and national security, facial recognition, automated audio-visual analysis and speech-to-text 
transcription are established tools, and there is considerable interest in methods that triage or filter data for 
examination, or which derive insights from large, disparate datasets and identify connections that would 
otherwise go unnoticed by human operators.5   However, alongside live facial recognition, it is perhaps the 
application of behavioural analytics to ‘predict’ risky or suspicious behaviour, or for the State to categorise a 
person, that raise the most concern from a legal and ethical perspective. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]   
 
Take the EU funded iBorderCtrl (Intelligent Portable Control System) project6 as an example; this project 
combines automated biometric scanning, facial recognition, document assessment, radar and acoustic 
sensors (for detecting hidden humans in vehicles), an algorithmic risk assessment tool combining various 
inputs to produce ‘actionable risk scores’ and finally (and most controversially) an ‘Automated Deception 
Detection System’, the AI equivalent of a polygraph and described as quantifying ‘the probability of deceit in 
interviews by analysing interviewees’ non-verbal micro-gestures’.7  This project encapsulates the 
challenges of the new digital environment.  Digital data can be collected and combined, and new 
information (or outputs) created which may be considered ‘useful’ by border control officers, an example of 
Brownsword ‘technological management’ with the aim of improving the effectiveness of the law and 
preventing wrongdoing.8 But the process necessitates vastly increased personal data processing, the 
(semi)automation of decision-making processes, the categorisation of individuals as risky by a hidden 
algorithm, and the creation of AI based on an arguably invalid scientific basis (i.e. that there are reliable 
bodily indicators of deception).9  Is it sufficient mitigation that a human remains ‘in the loop’?  This is just 
one of the questions that parts of the Work have sought to explore. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] 
 
This Commentary begins with an overview of the Work, dividing the pieces into three overarching themes: 
digital processing of information, legal conflicts and harms; data sharing and trust; and AI and algorithmic 
analysis in policing and the legal and policy framework.  It then assesses the Work’s contribution to 
knowledge, significant academic influences and highlights key citations of the Work in and outside 
academia.  Sections 3 and 4 discuss methodological approaches and types of interdisciplinarity and how 
these are reflected in the Work.  Finally, the Commentary reviews the progression of the research areas in 
2020 and potential future avenues for further investigation, concluding with an overall evaluation of the 
Work’s contribution to the field. 
   
1.1 Overview of the Work 
 
The Work not only reflects the digital developments of the last decade, but also my personal development 
as a legal researcher from a practice background who moved into academia in 2009.  While the character 
of the publications has changed and expanded over the period, the Work has remained grounded in a high 
level of practical application.  The Work has not however focused on the needs of the legal profession or 
‘focused exclusively on traditional legal materials and the techniques required to interpret them.’10  Instead, 
the Work is influenced by my 11 years' experience as an in-house counsel employed by technologies 
companies and the Government (following private practice and immediately prior to academia), a non-
traditional legal career route that has received comparatively little attention in the legal education literature.  
Guntz highlights that employed in-house lawyers assume significant non-legal managerial responsibilities, 
tending to be ‘generalist’ lawyers delivering services across a broad spectrum of legal issues and with an 
ability to understand the in-house client’s needs.11  Therefore, the operation of law in context, and the 
 
5 Alexander Babuta, Marion Oswald and Ardi Janjeva, ‘Artificial Intelligence and UK National Security: Policy 
Considerations’ (2020) RUSI Occasional Paper. 
6 https://www.iborderctrl.eu/ accessed 4 October 2020. 
7 https://www.iborderctrl.eu/Technical-Framework accessed 4 October 2020. 
8 Roger Brownsword, Law, Technology and Society: Re-Imagining the Regulatory Environment (Routledge 2019) 7. 
9 Javier Sánchez-Monedero & Lina Dencik, ‘The politics of deceptive borders: ‘biomarkers of deceit’ and the case of 
iBorderCtrl’ (2020) Information, Communication & Society. 
10 Fiona Cownie and Anthony Bradney, ‘Socio-legal studies: A challenge to the doctrinal approach’ in Dawn Watkins 
and Mandy Burton (eds) Research Methods in Law, Second Edition ( (Routledge 2018). 
11 Sally Gunz, ’Testing Educational Assumptions in the Context of the Non-Traditional Legal Career as a Corporate 





interaction of the law with perhaps competing business, policy or ethical issues,12 becomes just as 
important as a ‘black letter’ understanding of the law itself.  The Work has followed suit in part with a 
developing focus on law in context and interdisciplinary work (to be explored in more detail in sections 3 
and 4 below).  Pieces that are more doctrinal in nature [such as 12, 13, 14] have furthermore attempted to 
avoid the criticism that ‘doctrinal researchers do no more than ‘work the rules’ in isolation from practice or 
the theory underlying the rules, and without due consideration for how the rules might be improved or 
reformed.‘13       
 
Under the overarching theme of ‘legal clashes and uncertainties in the digital age’, it is possible to identify 
the following sub-themes within the Work representing the overlapping impacts of the digital environment 
as set out above: i) digital processing of information, legal conflicts and harms; ii) questions around data 
sharing and trust; iii) AI and algorithmic analysis in policing and the legal and policy framework. 
1.1.1 Digital processing of information, legal conflicts and harms 
 
Pieces 1, 7, 9, 13 and 14 fall within this sub-theme. 13 and 14 were my first peer reviewed publications 
after leaving in-house practice for academia.  These pieces reflect my interest in the interplay of laws 
relating to information – in particular, data protection, freedom of information and intellectual property. They 
analyse the freedom of information statutory regime (and related case-law) and a specific case-law 
decision14 respectively.  Despite this limited focus, both pieces identify conflicts and potential issues within 
the application of existing law.  Publication 14 challenged a tribunal decision that took the view that social 
media use implied a waiver of privacy in other contexts, a decision that was subsequently overturned 
substantially on grounds suggested in the article.15  Publication 13, written six years after the 
implementation of the Freedom of Information Act,16 considered the question of whether irreconcilable 
differences existed between freedom of information and copyright law due to the likelihood of online 
publication, and anticipated future Strasbourg interpretations of Article 10 ECHR as incorporating a right of 
access to information. 
 
At the end of 2014, at the invitation of the Society for Computers & Law, I made the following prediction for 
the year 2015: 
 
‘Two of the main players - 'data-hungry' corporations and privacy technologists - will develop new 
technologies in an attempt to frustrate the other. Both will argue that they have the 'innocent' end-user's 
best interests in mind. New tracking technology will defeat existing countermeasures. End-users will be 
encouraged to fight back with privacy-enhancing technologies, but apathy will, in the main, prevail. The law 
will cling to the concept of consent as the way of regulating personal data use, and to justify the imposition 
of one-sided terms and conditions by social media providers.’17 
 
Publications 1 and 7 are related pieces, exploring the above-mentioned digital environment, with 7 
developing the idea of ‘privacy vigilantism’, first coined in 1, as a potential means of tackling digital harms. 
This piece reviewed the landmark ‘right to be forgotten’ decision in Google Spain.18  It questioned whether 
the decision would make any significant difference to privacy and dignitary harms created or facilitated by 
new technologies, not only committed by corporations or Government but also by the individual ’surveillant 
on the street’.  My conclusion that ’Harmful data processing needs to be addressed head-on, which may 
mean dealing with problems in more than one place in the information lifecycle’ remains applicable today, 
 
12 Sally Gunz & Hugh Gunz, ‘Ethical Decision Making and the Employed Lawyer’ (2008) Journal of Business Ethics 
81(4), 927-944. 
13 Terry Hutchinson, ’Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds) Research 
Methods in Law, Second Edition ( (Routledge 2018). 
14 Morley v Information Commissioner and Surrey Heath Borough Council [2012] EA/2011/0173. 
15 Surrey Heath Borough Council v IC and Morley [2014] UKUT 0330 (AAC). 
16 2000, c. 36. 
17 Society for Computers and Law, ‘Predictions: Final Treats’ (10 December 2014) https://www.scl.org/blog/3261-
predictions-final-treats accessed 4 October 2020. 





as we see the UK Government struggling with the implementation of its Online Harms proposals.19   
Publication 7 developed the discussion of privacy in the online ’party’, critiquing case-law interpretations of 
the reasonable expectation of privacy and methods of ’privacy vigilantism’.  It built on approaches from 
other scholars and proposed a new model of ’misuse of the digital person’, designed not to prevent the 
observation of ’public’ information about an individual, but instead to protect the fundamentals of a person 
from undesirable digital intrusion.   
Publication 9 was the first UK academic article to critique the depiction of young children in television 
‘Science Entertainment’ based on FOI-based and empirical research and the application of privacy, medical 
and child-law principles.  It developed the theory of ‘Generation Tagged‘ -  young children whose images 
and identity appear on digital media as a result of the action of others.  As at the date of writing, it is the 




Have ‘Generation Tagged’ lost their privacy?21  
 
Although its focus is intrusion into children‘s privacy created by certain forms of broadcast programming, its 
context is the ’always on’ digital age which exacerbates and expands the reach of those intrusions.  This 
publication too proposed specific measures to tackle misuse.  It argued that the legal framework had failed 
to keep track with the changing nature of broadcast programming.  Digital on-demand services make 
broadcasts less ephemeral, and parallel social media interactions become part of the online record, with 
even old information more easily accessible due to digital search tools. 
1.1.2 Data sharing and trust 
 
My prediction for the year 2014 focused on the importance of effective use of information for the protection 
of the vulnerable: 
 
‘The Serious Case Reviews into the deaths of Keanu Williams and Daniel Pelka, CEOP's assessment 'The 
Foundations of Abuse' and the Children's Commissioner's inquiry into child sexual exploitation in gangs all 
criticised the robustness of data sharing between public bodies. 'Instances of concern tended to be viewed 
in isolation with a lack of attention to patterns developing' (Williams SCR). So why, when hardly a day goes 
by without the trumpeting of the potential of Big Data, data intelligence, profiling and so on, do these issues 
persist? A crisis of confidence around data protection? Over-reliance on consent? Privacy concerns around 
problem-profiling? Little understanding about the value of intelligence? Fears that anonymised data will be 
easily re-identified? Incompatible IT systems? Lack of trust between agencies? Cautious lawyers?  I predict 
 
19 BBC News, ‘Online Harms bill: Warning over ‘unacceptable’ delay’ (29 June 2020) 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53222665. accessed 4 October 2020. 
20 https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rjml20/current accessed 4 October 2020. 
21 Publication 9 and the research behind it was immortalised in Lego™ in the University of Winchester Images of 
Research exhibition 2017 https://www.flickr.com/photos/149999106@N05/32344166566/in/album-





(and hope) that the outcome of the Law Commission's consultation into data sharing between public bodies 
will challenge us all to get to grip with these issues once and for all.’22 
 
Publications 10, 11 and 12 expand on these concerns under the theme of data sharing (and 10 and 11 
have a close connection with the third theme relating to AI and algorithmic analysis).  In everyday 
language, we often use the word ‘share’ to mean giving something to someone (perhaps temporarily) or 
letting someone ‘have a go.’ We insist righteously that our children share their toys with others, although as 
adults, if we share, we want safeguards; we want the Government to guarantee our savings; we want to 
know that someone will not copy our idea; we want to know that someone takes responsibility for any 
damage to our property. And in respect of personal data, the potential for damage is so much more difficult 
to quantify compared to, say, the sharing of physical property: ‘there are many tangible benefits to be 
gained by allowing intrusions into one’s life, but there is also the intangible worry. We simply find it hard, as 
humans, to balance the tangible benefits and the intangible costs.’23 Our decision may come down to first, 
what benefits we believe we will gain by sharing our data, and secondly, whether we trust the organisation 
that acquires our data.24 
 
Publication 12 was written in the context of the calls for mandatory reporting of child abuse to be introduced 
in light of the above scandals.  It took a comparative and historical approach to the question of whether 
mandatory reporting was a necessary remedy to the societal horror of child abuse, learning in particular 
from the 50 years’ experience of such laws in the United States, and English law negligence and human 
rights actions.  Publication 11 widened the focus on data sharing by way of an exploratory empirical study 
to ask whether the necessity of public services results in a readiness by individuals to share personal data 
and sacrifice a measure of privacy.  Both the literature review and the empirical study suggested the more 
tangible and/or immediate the benefit, the stronger the correlation with comfort in data sharing, leading to 
the conclusion that trust in data sharing initiatives might be improved by a local, institution-led approach (a 
lesson that remains pertinent to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic response). 
 
Publication 10 focused upon police databases of ‘intelligence’ considering the Supreme Court decision in 
Catt,25 a decision that was subsequently overturned in part by the European Court of Human Rights.26   The 
piece discussed the tensions that arise between privacy and human rights, and police efficacy and 
operational pressures, in the context of intelligence gathering, sharing and analysis.  This piece represents 
my first formal foray into the world of law enforcement data analysis, an area that now represents a 
significant part of my research, and the first joint work with a researcher who has become a valued 
collaborator.  We concluded, inter alia, that not enough attention had yet been paid, in the regulation of 
intelligence, to existing and potential electronic data analysis techniques.  This is an important area to 
which I return in the remaining publications. 
 
Underlying the above pieces is a concern about trust and trustworthiness,27 between those organisations 
sharing public sector data, between individuals and public sector organisations using information, and in 
respect of the governing law itself.  Trust has become a key theme in current dialogue concerning the 
deployment of digital technologies,28 including proposals for ‘data trusts‘29 which have obtained some 
 
22 Society for Computers and Law, ‘Predictions 2014: Batch2’ (6 December 2013) https://www.scl.org/blog/2971-
predictions-2014-batch-2. accessed 4 October 2020. 
23 Kieron O’Hara and Nigel Shadbolt, The Spy in the coffee machine: the end of privacy as we know it (1st edition, 
Oneworld 2008) 5. 
24 Marion Oswald, ’Share and share alike - attitudes towards data sharing in the UK public sector’ (2014) Privacy and 
Data Protection 14(3), 15. 
25 R (Catt) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis & Anor and another [2015] UKSC 9. 
26 Catt v UK App. No. 43514/15 (ECHR, 24 January 2019). 
27 O’Hara defines trust and trustworthiness as two sides of the same coin: trustworthiness is the virtue of reliably 
meeting one’s commitments, while trust is the belief of another that the trustee is trustworthy – Kieron O’Hara, ‘A 
general definition of trust’ (2012) Southampton, GB. University of Southampton https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/341800/ 
accessed 4 October 2020.  
28 See for instance: David Anderson, ’A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review’ (June 2015); 
Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, ’Addressing trust in public sector data use’ (20 July 2020). 
29 Wendy Hall and Jerome Pesenti, Growing the Artificial Intelligence Industry in the UK (London: Department for 





traction despite being incapable - it appears - of being legal trusts.30   This aspect is discussed further in 
section 2. 
1.1.3 AI and algorithmic analysis in policing and the legal and policy framework 
 
This third theme focuses upon advanced algorithms used by the police to derive insights, inform 
operational decision-making or make predictions.  The use of machine learning algorithms by the police 
has grown in importance over recent years, as the police explore how new technologies might facilitate 
more efficient and effective working in an age of austerity.  Publications 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 revolve around this 
theme, and aim to address three main areas: a) identifying the legal, policy and operational issues arising 
from existing or potential use of AI and algorithmic analysis within policing; b) considering the implications 
of the focus on algorithmic ‘prediction’; and c) questioning if and how 'human' legal principles such as 
reasonableness and natural justice can govern this kind of augmented decision making. 
The use of ‘Austerity AI’31 in order to make individual predictions in connection with the preventative and 
public protection mission of the police has created a divide between those who promote the benefits and 
opportunities of data science within policing and those who stress the risks and issues.  The Work has 
attempted to bridge that divide.  Furthermore (and this reflects my experience as an in-house counsel), the 
Work has attempted to address the realities of the operational front line, where decisions made can have 
significant legal and societal implications but theoretical and doctrinal debates command little attention 
unless translated to address operational and strategic imperatives. 
 
Publication 8 was the first publication within the Work to focus upon this line of research, seeking to 
establish the extent to which algorithmic analysis of intelligence is currently used in UK policing and making 
a number of recommendations regarding the legality, accountability and transparency of 'algorithmic' police 
intelligence analysis.  Surprisingly, there is not a clear picture of the extent to which machine learning is 
deployed within UK policing and our freedom of information-based research aimed to contribute to 
addressing this gap.  Publication 6 built on this analysis; with the cooperation of Durham Constabulary, it 
was the first UK academic publication to critique an operational algorithmic tool within a UK police force to 
inform the ongoing legal and ethical debate around data analytics in policing.  It has been extensively cited 
and quoted to inform the public debate in this area.  Based on the research, the article proposed a 
decision-making framework called ‘Algocare’ (which has since been adopted by the National Police Chiefs’ 
Council (see section 2)).  It also argued for a new model of ‘experimental proportionality’, designed to 
permit the use of unproven data technologies in the public sector in order that benefits and harms can be 
fully explored, yet giving the public confidence that such use would be controlled and time-limited and the 
proportionality subject to a further (non-presumptive) review on a stipulated future date.  In doing so, I 
would argue that we are using our ‘imagination’ as encouraged by Brownsword to rework traditional 
principles to apply to the situations and issues that new technologies present.32 
 
This overall research theme develops in publications 2, 3 and 5.  Publication 5 takes an original approach 
to reformulating longstanding administrative law principles to new algorithm-assisted public sector 
environments.  It argues that the principles of administrative law are concerned with human decisions 
involved in the exercise of state power and discretion, thus offering a promising avenue for the regulation of 
the growing number of algorithm-assisted decisions within the public sector.  Publications 2 and 3 were 
based upon participatory research exploring the legal, regulatory and ethical challenges presented by the 
use of machine learning within policing.  Publication 2 was commissioned by the Centre for Data Ethics and 
Innovation as part of its ongoing review of data bias, with one of the publication’s original contributions 
being a project lifecycle approach to assessing the risk of bias.33 
 
30 Christine Rinik, ‘Data trusts: more data than trust? The perspective of the data subject in the face of a growing 
problem’ (2020) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 34(3), 342-363. 
31 Marion Oswald and Alexander Babuta, ‘Machine Learning Predictive Algorithms and the Policing of Future Crimes: 
Governance and Oversight’ (October 31, 2019) in John L.M. McDaniel and Ken Pease OBE (eds) Policing and 
Artificial Intelligence (Routledge, Forthcoming 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3479081.  
32 Roger Brownsword, Law 3.0 (Routledge 2021), 16. 
 







Finally publication 4 uses an historical perspective to examine the deployment of the polygraph within the 
criminal justice and considers the analogies and parallels to today’s use of machine learning.  It argues that 
a reforming legal realist approach can be identified in both contexts and proposes a number of regulatory 
solutions informed by the early lie detector experience. 
2. Contribution to knowledge 
 
2.1 Cyberlaw and the law of the horse   
 
The Work sits within the area of academic studies commonly called Cyberlaw or Information [Technology] 
Law.  In 1996, US Judge Easterbrook famously and derogatorily equated this area of law to the law of the 
horse:  
 
‘Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people kicked by horses; still more deal 
with the licensing and racing of horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes 
at horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on 'The Law of the Horse' is 
doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles.’34 
 
Therefore, I am at risk, as Easterbrook put it, of ‘multidisciplinary dilettantism’.  
 
In response to Easterbrook, Lessig countered that Cyberlaw can ‘illuminate the entire law’ as it involves 
considering how law and cyberspace connect; ‘it is a feature of cyberspace that interferes with the 
particular end’ (privacy, protecting kids from porn and so on)35 – different from the horse which cannot 
generally interfere with important societal aims!  We therefore must ask whether we change cyberspace or 
the law/societal goal itself.  Murray questions whether Lessig in fact successfully rebutted Easterbrook or 
whether he simply pled ’special circumstances’; mainstream lawyers continue to see cyber as a case-study 
for their subject, not a freestanding topic of study.36   Marsden is more bullish: the 2020s will be ’the decade 
of cyberlaw‘ as it is ’vital to understanding regulation of platforms, of artificial intelligence and robotics, of 
blockchains, of automated vehicles, and of disinformation in our democracies.’37   Cyberlaw ’was a horse 
that was destined to bolt’ according to Brownsword; Easterbrook was wrong because he ’not only failed to 
anticipate the regulatory thinking of much of the incoming law of cyberspace but he failed to anticipate that 
the law might engage with cybertechnologies as both regulatory targets (technologies to be regulated) and 
regulatory tools (technologies to be used by regulators).’38 
 
So what, within the field of Cyberlaw, is the Work attempting to do?  Within publication 7, 20 years after 
Easterbook’s law of the horse, I argued the following: 
 
‘Digital technologies operating in real world settings link to online search, investigation and 
identification technologies in order to return information to those real world settings (an example 
being the deployment of facial recognition technologies within shops, not only for crime-prevention 
but to enable the retailer to identity age, gender and race, with the potential for digital photographs 
taken in the real world to be compared to those online.) The process is so interlinked that it could 
almost be said that there is no longer any point in trying to distinguish the real and the cyber.’ 
 
 
and Algorithms in Policing in England and Wales: Towards A New Policy Framework’ (2020) RUSI Occasional Paper 
 https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/data-analytics-and-algorithms-policing-england-and-wales-towards-new.  
34 Frank H. Easterbrook, ‘Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse’ 1996 University of Chicago Legal Forum 207 (1996). 
35 Lawrence Lessig, ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach’ (1999) 113 Harvard Law Review 501-549. 
36 Andrew Murray, ‘Looking back at the Law of the Horse: Why Cyberlaw and the Rule of Law are Important’ (2013) 
ScriptEd 10(3). 
37 Christopher T. Marsden, ’The Regulated End of Internet Law, and the Return to Computer and Information Law?’ in 
Kevin Werbach (ed) After the Digital Tornedo (Cambridge University Press 2020) 36. 






Cyber is no longer a separate ‘thing’ that can be studied in isolation, in the way a horse can. The digital and 
the cyber are now firmly embedded within our society and ways of living and working, with resultant 
consequences for how the law operates or should operate.  Therefore, while strongly disputing the charge 
of dilettantism, I would defend the need to develop interdisciplinary awareness and be able to think 
across legal and other boundaries within Cyberlaw studies.  I encourage students to think of Cyberlaw 
as a system of interlocking jigsaw pieces with consideration of digital technologies at their heart, including, 
but not limited to, laws that target specific technologies or digital harms (Fig. 1).  It is impossible (for me at 
least) to be an expert in all pieces of the jigsaw.  This does not however result in dilettantism or 
superficiality.  To borrow from Donald Rumsfeld,39 it is important if we wish to gain some level of 
understanding to be aware of ‘known unknowns’ - these are the issues that I know are relevant to the issue 
at hand but that I do not know, but can find out.  (The ’unknown unknowns’ are more difficult but can be 
addressed by interdisciplinary working – see section 4 below).  The strength of a good in-house counsel is 
– in my view – an awareness of known unknowns and an ability to address them.  This is equally applicable 
to the academic arena where an awareness of what is within ’scope’ of the research, and what is relevant 
but outside scope of the specific project or the researcher’s expertise, is crucial.  I would therefore 
categorise myself as a generalist in the field of Cyberlaw who attempts to use relevant and connected legal 
frameworks to illuminate the impact of digital technologies.   
 
Those from a practice background often struggle against an external or internal view that they are not 
enough of an ‘academic’ or do not conform to the requirements of the disciplinary field.  However, I support 
Bash and Ashar’s contention that work by those with a clinical background ‘(1) is grounded in observation 
of lived reality and awareness of the operation of interlocking systems (2) incorporates an innate criticality 
borne of the activism and advocacy of clinicians, and (3) meaningfully and productively generates and 




Fig. 1: Some of the pieces of the Cyberlaw jigsaw 
 
 
2.2 Significant academic influences 
 
The Work discusses and builds upon the work of many scholars in the field, both within law and other 
disciplines such as computer science.  I gratefully acknowledge the ideas of all these scholars in 
developing and expanding my knowledge, understanding and thinking, including those in particular 
identified below.  
 
 
39 US Department of Defense News Briefing (February 12, 2002) 
https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636 accessed 4 October 2020. 
40 Wendy A. Bach and Sameer M. Ashar, ‘Critical Theory and Clinical Stance’ (2019) Clinical Law Review, 26(81), 81-





Eric Barendt’s critique of the reasonable expectation of privacy test41 was an influential underpinning of the 
research in publications 7 and 9, including the conclusion that the legal and ethical framework had failed to 
keep track with the changing nature of broadcast programming as part of the online record.  This research 
also led (in a further publication documenting related workshop proceedings) to a recommendation that 
young children should have a privacy right independent of their parents and the need for a duty of care on 
internet intermediaries to consider children’s best interests in their operations,42  pre-dating the UK 
Government’s proposal of a duty of care for online harms and the reference to best interests of the child in 
the ICO’s 2020 Age Appropriate Design Code.43   
 
In thinking about C21st digital culture, I was also influenced by Neil Postman’s 1985 book ’Amusing 
ourselves to death’44 in which (in the context of TV news) Postman argued that we should worry about 
Huxley’s Brave New World rather than Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.  The ‘trivial pursuit’ information 
environment risked amusing us into indifference and a kind of ‘culture-death.’  Postman’s warnings seemed 
equally relevant when I considered the surveillant on the street; the ‘YouTube Families’ phenomenon; 
younger and younger children featuring on mainstream broadcasts, with public comment via social media 
using the inevitable hashtag.  As Cohen argues, surveillant assemblages of informational capitalism 
‘beckon with seductive appeal’45 and therefore it is not enough to expect individuals to be objective 
defenders of their own - or other’s - best interests when it comes to the cumulative effect of digital 
intrusions and surveillance. 
 
In the context of digital processing and data sharing, the limitations of the public/private dichotomy 
highlighted by Helen Nissenbaum 46 informed my concerns about the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test.  My criticism of the Morley decision in publication 14 could be said to reflect Nissenbaum‘s ’contextual 
integrity‘ approach to privacy based on applicable norms.47  Nissenbaum’s approach, however, is ultimately 
based upon an individualistic approach to privacy protection.  Individuals must assert and defend the 
’appropriate’ treatment of personal data in circumstances ‘where entrenched norms and what appear to be 
promising new norms for personal information find themselves in conflict.‘48  It is not an approach that can, 
of itself, determine acceptable and unacceptable data processing with any certainty; Rule comments:  
 
‘Nearly anyone can readily picture his or her favored use of personal information as “consistent” with 
the “contexts” ascribed to it. The problem is, there are bound to be as many interpretations of what 
constitutes the relevant context, and the standard of consistency, as there are positions on the 
ideological spectrum of participants.’49    
 
Methods deployed by the ‘privacy vigilante’, including obfuscation technologies promoted by Nissenbaum, 
are in my view symptoms of rights-based approaches which push too much responsibility onto the 
individual to defend her rights and to understand and express her preferences.  As Kieron O’Hara (whose 
work on conceptions of privacy and trust and technology has been a significant influence) argues, these 
 
41 Eric Barendt, ‘Problems with the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test’ (2016) Journal of Media Law, 8(2), 129-
137. 
42 Marion Oswald, Helen James, Emma Nottingham, Rachel Hendry and Sophie Woodman, ‘Have 'Generation 
Tagged' Lost Their Privacy? A report on the consultation workshop to discuss the legislative, regulatory and ethical 
framework surrounding the depiction of young children on digital, online and broadcast media’ (2017) 
https://winchester.elsevierpure.com/en/publications/have-generation-tagged-lost-their-privacy-a-report-on-the-consult-
3.  
43 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Age appropriate design: a code of practice for online services’ (2020)  
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47 Ibid. 
48 James B. Rule, ‘Contextual Integrity and its Discontents: A Critique of Helen Nissenbaum's Normative Arguments’ 
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neoliberal antagonistic approaches are not conducive to the development of trust.50  Furthermore, the 
individualistic nature of data protection law limits its effectiveness in tackling systematic unfairness or 
harms and ensuring organisational accountability, and in these considerations, I acknowledge the doctrinal 
work of Lilian Edwards51 and Orla Lynskey52 in particular.  
 
This concern has also informed my research and publications around algorithmic decision-making and the 
way that information technologies can shape how we perceive the world53 and alter human decision-making 
agency.  As I laid out in publication 5, the implementation of algorithm-informed decision-making creates a 
significant risk of ignoring or changing the question that the public sector decision-maker has to answer; 
indeed, all the administrative law grounds set out in this article (the duty to give reasons, relevant and 
irrelevant considerations, and fettering discretion) were prescient of the issues raised in respect of Ofqual’s 
2020 A-level moderation algorithm.  I give significant credit to the research of Mireille Hildebrandt in 
expanding my thinking in this area.  Hildebrandt works on the cusp of law and computer science, 
philosophy of law and philosophy of technology, and as a lawyer from a practitioner background, I 
acknowledge that I find engagement with her work a challenge but a welcome one.  I have been influenced 
by Hildebrandt’s concept of the ’incomputable self’54 and her concerns around data-driven agency: ‘where 
observations are limited to digital data and actions are informed by the computational processing of such 
data.’55  My aim has been to focus on a high level of practicality in reflecting upon these concepts and 
translating them into the context of algorithm-assisted State decision-making. 
 
Publications 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 sit within the bodies of literature addressing legality and the use of emerging 
technology by the State (specifically policing) and the clashes that occur through the interaction between 
legal and technological norms.  In one sense, my work has followed Lessig’s concept of the judge as 
translator when it comes to law and technology: 
 
‘We must always adopt readings of the Constitution that preserve its original values.  When dealing 
with cyberspace, judges are to be translators: Different technologies are the different languages, 
and the aim is to find a reading of the Constitution that preserves its meaning from one world’s 
technology to another.’56 
 
The Work has been concerned with the application of ‘old’ law to new technologies and their deployment by 
the State, and the translation of underlying principles to new contexts.  It has built on Andrew Le Sueur’s 
work on robot government57 and Karen Yeung’s research into algorithmic regulation,58 and has developed 
alongside Michael Veale and Reuben Binns’ work on algorithmic accountability.59   The Work is both 
reactive to operational computer science and algorithmic developments, implications and assumptions (in 
policing, the research of Richard Berk and Geoff Barnes60 on algorithmic prediction has influenced the 
practice of operational policing), and in parallel aims to increase understanding of the implications of the 
law for such developments, their design and use.  
 
50 Kieron O’Hara, ‘Data Trusts: Ethics, Architecture and Governance for Trustworthy Data Stewardship’ (2019) Web 
Science Institute White Papers, Southampton, University of Southampton, 9. 
51 Lilian Edwards, 'With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility?': The Rise of Platform Liability’ in Lilian Edwards 
(ed) Law, Policy and the Internet (Hart Publishing 2019). 
52 Orla Lynskey, 'Criminal justice profiling and EU data protection law: precarious protection from predictive policing' 
(2019) International Journal of Law in Context 15(2), 162-176. 
53 n45, 1913.  
54 Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Privacy As Protection of the Incomputable Self: From Agnostic to Agonistic Machine Learning’ 
(2019) Theoretical Inquiries of Law 20(1), 83-121. 
55 Mireille Hildebrandt and Kieron O’Hara (eds) Life and the Law in the Era of Data-Driven Agency (Edward Elgar 
2020) 1-2. 
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59 Michael Veale and Max Van Kleek and Reuben Binns, ‘Fairness and Accountability Design Needs for Algorithmic 
Support in High-Stakes Public Sector Decision-Making’ (April 21, 2018). Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on 
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Finally - and perhaps my most important academic influence - are my joint authors,61 with whom I have 
developed doctrinal and socio-legal understanding and theories, operational insight and interdisciplinary 
research.  These collaborative projects, which have been interdisciplinary both within the legal ’discipline‘ 
and outside it, have led me ’to a more informed and more balanced judgment and...a deeper understanding 
than someone who is only interested in the ‘law as such’’, thus providing confidence to ’make an informed 
policy recommendation because interdisciplinary research provides her [me] with a more comprehensive 
view of a particular topic.’62 
 
2.3 Citations of the Work and impacts outside of academia 
 
This section highlights key citations of the Work within academic commentary and the most significant 
impact of the Work outside academia. 
 
Publication 6 was the first academic article in the UK to analyse the legal and societal issues raised by an 
operational algorithmic tool in the policing environment (the Harm Assessment Risk Tool deployed by 
Durham Constabulary).  It was written from an interdisciplinary perspective alongside the force’s head of 
criminal justice (Urwin) and machine learning tool designer (Barnes) and proposed a new decision-making 
model called ‘Algocare’ to highlight key questions and issues that police forces should review when 
considering an algorithmic tool.  At the date of writing, 6 has been cited by 45 academic publications63 
including by Yeung for a Council of Europe study,64 by Spiegelhalter in the Harvard Data Science Review,65 
by Lynskey in her review of criminal justice profiling and data protection law,66 and in a review on 
Government Use of Artificial Intelligence in New Zealand.67   Its findings have been a reference point for 
further academic research including by Charlesworth.68    
 
Publication 5 has been cited in over 20 articles including by Yeung,69 Cobbe,70 Veale,71 Binns72 and 
Hildebrandt.73 It was cited in a House of Lords Library briefing in preparation for a debate on the 
implications of decision-making and prediction by algorithm in the public sector.74 The article was quoted by 
Lord St John of Bletso in the Parliamentary debate on Algorithms and Public Sector Decision-making: ‘In 
deciding upon the relevance of algorithmic output to a decision by a public sector body, the decision-maker 
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Wellington 2019).  
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Regulation (Oxford University Press 2019), 27. 
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should have the discretion to assess unthought of relevant factors and whether the decision is one for 
which the algorithm was designed.’75 
 
Publication 8 has also been cited internationally, by New Zealand scholars in an exploration of 
transparency in algorithmic decision-making, 76 and by the United Nations in a 2019 report into AI in the 
delivery of public services.77  Publication 9 has contributed to further debate around digital child rights and 
parental consent,78 with the research being further developed by my fellow author, Emma Nottingham, in 
her research into sharenting and the rights of micro-celebrities.79  Publication 13 was cited by Oster in his 
book ‘Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right’.80  Publication 14 was cited by Selvadurai in a discussion of 
online privacy protection proposed by new Australian laws.81  Publication 4 has been cited by sociologists 
Paul, Fischer and Voigt in their review of the ‘anachronistic progress’ of the polygraph in the juridical field in 
Germany.82 
 
Outside academia, the ’Algocare’ framework proposed in 6 was adopted by the National Police Chiefs’ 
Council (Business Change Council) and recommended for local force use; the framework supports written 
submissions to the West Midlands Police & Crime Commissioner and West Midlands Police data ethics 
committee (which I was invited to chair due to my experience in this field).  The research has enabled and 
influenced campaigns and thinking by campaigning groups and think-tanks. Publication 6 was cited by 
privacy campaigning organisation Big Brother Watch in its blog and campaign against the use of Mosaic 
data by Durham Constabulary,83 and by Liberty in its influential report on predictive policing.84  Publication 2 
was cited by Amnesty International in its 2020 report on predictive policing in the Netherlands.85  The 
Centre for Public Impact has used publication 6 to inform its supporting policing case study for its report 
‘How to make AI work in government and for people’.86  
Furthermore, the Work has informed policy development and political debate.  My evidence informed by 
publication 8 was cited on page 14 of the Commons Science & Technology Committee report into 
algorithms in decision-making 23 May 2018.87  Evidence informed by publication 6 was cited on page 42 of 
the Lords AI Committee’s 2018 report.88 The All-Party Parliamentary Group report on data analytics cited 
 
75 House of Lords, ‘Algorithms: Public Sector Decision-Making – Question for Short Debate’ 12 February 2020. 
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publications 3 and 6 and my associated written evidence extensively on pages 35-40.89 In launching the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life’s review of AI and Public Standards, the Chair, Lord Evans, stated 
that publication 3 'was part of the reason I thought there was an issue here, on the ethical framework that 
we should apply to application of this in a law enforcement context.'90 Publications 5 and 6 informed the 
work of the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology in developing its report on interpretable 
machine learning.91 
The Work informed my invited oral evidence and related written evidence to the Law Society commission 
on algorithms in the justice system92 and the resultant Law Society Report on algorithm use in the criminal 
justice system cited publications 6 and 8 at 7.1, 7.3.1 and 7.3.6.93 The 2019 report on data-driven policing 
from the influential Police Foundation takes up three of the recommendations from publication 3.94  
Publication 6 and the Algocare framework were cited extensively in ‘Better use of data and advanced 
statistics / machine learning in delivering benefits to the fuel poor’ prepared by Deloitte LLP for the 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy.95 
The results of the research published in 11 were cited by the Law Commission in its scoping report ‘Data 
Sharing between Public Bodies’ in July 2014.96  It was also cited by O’Hara, Shadbolt and Hall in their 
paper ‘A Pragmatic Approach to the Right to be Forgotten.’97  My proposal for a new model of ‘misuse of 
the digital person’ as discussed in publication 7 was included in a proposal by science commentator Anjana 
Ahuja for a radio documentary, which was approved for production by the BBC.  I was interviewed for the 
documentary on 5 July 2016 and it was broadcast on 11 September 2016.98 
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Finally, of a number of media and press publications to discuss the Work (including the Mail,99 the Law 
Society Gazette100 and Engineering & Technology101), the one of which I am most proud is Private Eye 
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3. Methodologies  
 
In this section, I have taken methodology to mean the research approach - ‘how to find relevant 
information, how to organize it, and how to interpret the results’ or ‘the steps taken by the researcher to 
travel from the problem statement to the conclusion.’103   Looking back at my transition from practice to 
academia, I acknowledge that, as well as having a ’healthy skepticism...about theory generation,’104 the 
same could be said of methodology.  I was used to drafting, advising and interpreting but had less time to 
consider concepts, ideas and purposes of law, or to analyse how I was ‘doing‘ law.   
 
The Work has provided the opportunity to consider the ways in which my research has been conducted.  
My approach is grounded in experience of what could be described as the ’standard’ doctrinal legal 
methodology as deployed by practising lawyers and judges: ‘the search for a ‘system’ of general, logically 
consistent principles, built up from the study of particular instances’ using ‘logical deductions derived from a 
priori propositions, and the principles of inductive generalisation and analogous reasoning.’105   It has not 
however taken a positivist approach in the sense of concentrating solely on a ’closed’ system of the law as 
it ’is’ and which is assumed to be objective.  As an academic with a practice background, I recognise Bach 
and Ashar’s description of an ‘embedded clinical stance’ within my scholarship.106 Within the Work, there 
are also aspects of what they describe as ‘critical theory’ in the process that I have undertaken: ‘Observe 
from a particular position the operation of a set of laws and systems, describe the subject as it is perceived 
from that vantage point (sometimes deploying and sometimes generating or revising theory), and then 
deploy these insights to bolster and justify the demand —- see, describe, generate/deploy, demand.’107   I 
am concerned not only with what the law ’says’ but how it is interpreted, viewed and (sometimes) abused 
by those advising upon, subject to and enforcing the law, and what policy and other extra-legal factors 
affect the effectiveness of the law.  Socio-legal perspectives can of course improve doctrine.108  I am a 
strong believer in the normative value of law in providing a guide and reasons for behaviour, although I am 
under no illusions that law - absent good faith interpretation and robust oversight and regulation - will be 
sufficient to guarantee correct action or a moral outcome.  This aspect has been an important element of 
the pieces exploring AI and policing in particular.  
 
The pieces therefore consistently deploy a mixed-methods approach, combining doctrinal and law-in-
context/law-in-action approaches with empirical research, historical and comparative methods, freedom of 
information request methods and/or participatory research with multidisciplinary collaboration, thus 
deepening the perspectives and issues identified and explored.  Using Minow’s categorisation, I have: 
gathered ‘more than one line of cases, across doctrinal fields, and show[n] why they belong together or 
expose doctrinal discrepancies’ (for instance 10); pursued ‘policy analysis’ and proposed alternative 
schemes or methods (for instance 2 and 3); undertaken an empirical investigation into a proposition to 
investigate its validity (for instance 11), engaged in critical projects to expose tensions within a body of law, 
and attempted to link them to larger social difficulties (for instance 9 and 12), engaged in historical inquiry in 
order to contextualise the selected era using history and illuminate differences, choices or continuities when 
compared with contemporary practice (4), and developed a theory that tries to explain how areas of law fit 
together and contributes to a practical problem (for instance 4, 6 and 7).109  The benefits and challenges of 
interdisciplinary research are discussed in section 4.  I will therefore focus in the remainder of this section 
on my empirical and historical research and the challenges of these approaches.   
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Empirical research can help us to ‘be better at seeing and describing.’110  The following approaches have 
been deployed in the Work: participatory research interviews and grounded theory analysis (2 and 3), 
empirical research based on freedom of information responses (8) and qualitative and quantitative analysis 
of a questionnaire exploring attitudes to data sharing (11).  I also undertook an informal analysis of the 
content of Twitter messages as described in 9.  The underlying reason for deploying these empirical 
elements was to ’foster connection and holism in solving research problems’.111 The participatory research 
approach allowed us to gain from the experience of stakeholders in the assessment of the real-world 
context, actors and institutions, diagnosis of the issues and consideration of policy requirements.112  I am 
aware however that building research relationships through practice or from engagement in the work of 
others113 can raise questions from a research perspective about neutrality, detachment and bias in terms of 
being too close to those involved in the system.114  However, it would seem impossible for a researcher to 
have no knowledge of the context or literature in which she is working.  Concerns regarding neutrality were 
mitigated to a certain extent by purposive selection of interviewees to ensure a cross-section of 
standpoints, use of a ’snowball’ sampling strategy where initial interviewees proposed subsequent interview 
participants for interview, and by achieving ’data saturation’ such that later interviews did not produce data 
that led to any new themes.115    
 
A freedom of information-based approach allowed us to obtain information about an issue (the extent of the 
use of algorithmic analysis by police forces) that was not well known or publicly available.  Savage and 
Hyde identify the following advantages: ’Whilst we could have approached the authorities and attempted to 
negotiate voluntary access to such data, such negotiations would be lengthy and unlikely to produce 
uniform answers to the research questions posed in the study. Freedom of information requests can be 
dispatched to multiple local authorities at the same time, allowing information held by public authorities to 
be obtained cheaply and in a uniform fashion. This data can then be usefully compared, allowing trends to 
be discerned.’116   Freedom of information requests not only enable us to obtain information; the ’round-
robin’ requests sent to all police force permit differences and inconsistences to be identified, particularly 
valuable for research concerned with the consistent and fair use of state power and activities that raise rule 
of law concerns.   
 
Publication 11 is perhaps the most ambitious piece of empirical research, aiming as it does to explore the 
influence of social factors – specifically trust - on understanding and acceptance of legal concepts and legal 
supports such as data anonymisation, and models of data collection based on public interest rather than 
consent.  It might be said that this piece is not very legal.  I would argue however that an exploration of 
attitudes to data ‘sharing’ can inform the effectiveness (or otherwise) of legal, regulatory and policy 
measures designed to engender trust in public sector activities, providing a more robust underpinning for 
the conclusions.  The empirical element also assists in the generalisation of the results for a non-legal 
audience.117 I freely confess that at the start of the project, I had probably underestimated the time and 
effort required for even this modest empirical data collection, and the work needed to ensure that the data 
was analysed in a statistically appropriate manner.  The National Health Service research ethics application 
alone involved the submission of answers to over seventy questions.  However, the empirical results 
(although exploratory) gave me some confidence in the answer to the research question, and how the 
findings could contribute to the handling of public sector data sharing initiatives in the future.  One of these 
findings was that the more tangible the public service, the more trust is shown in it.  Thus, I could argue that 
data sharing initiatives, even if ’legal’ on the face of it, might benefit from a bottom-up institution led 
approach. 
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Finally in this section, I comment briefly on the historical research in publications 4 and 12.  Both pieces 
took an external approach to legal history – described by Cahillane as ‘almost a historical version of the 
socio-legal approach’118 - together with a comparative element focused on identifying and proposing best 
practice and lessons to be learned.  It was important therefore to be cognisant of the differences in legal 
systems, and the limitations of my own knowledge of those systems, when drawing conclusions.  I 
attempted to avoid the danger of using history simply to explain the present or viewing history as linear 
progress.119   The use of history can however ’illustrate … how legal precepts – rules, principles, 
conceptions and standards – have met concrete situations of fact in organising human society in the past 
and enabling or helping us to judge how we may deal with such situations with some assurance in the 
present.’120 I also used elements of what has been described as ‘legal archaeology’121 within my approach 
in publication 4, including the consideration of case facts in their historical context, and wider historical and 
social settings.  This approach enabled me to draw analogies between the historical use of the polygraph 
and modern day machine learning, with historical material, and comparison with current activities, 
supporting my conclusion that a utilitarian ’reforming legal realist’ attitude can be detected in the arguments 
of both the early proponents of the polygraphs and current AI enthusiasts.     
4. Interdisciplinarity within the Work 
 
Balkin describes interdisciplinary scholars as ‘romantic rebels’, questioning authority by ‘transgressing 
disciplinary boundaries...in the service of a greater truth.’122   Although it would be rather satisfying to 
categorise the Work in this way, it would be going too far!  The Work remains grounded in the law, while 
aiming to avoid ‘an unhealthy preoccupation with technicalities’.123   I noted above that much of the Work is 
interdisciplinary both within the legal discipline and outside it.  In this section, I review selected definitions of 
‘interdisciplinarity’ within legal research and reflect on which, if any, of these forms of interdisciplinarity are 
present within the Work.   
 
Siems argues that there is no uniform definition of ‘multi‐’, ‘inter‐’, ‘trans‐’ and ‘cross‐disciplinarity’, nor as to 
the degree of synthesis required for interdisciplinarity,124 although this has not prevented scholars from 
proposing such definitions or categorisations.  Siems himself suggests a taxonomy (Fig. 2) based on the 
type of question addressed (legal or otherwise) and the subordinate or integrated way of involving the other 
discipline(s).   
 
 Approaches that keep 
disciplines separate 
Approaches that integrate 
‘scientific’ methods into legal 
thinking 
Legal questions Basic interdisciplinary 
research 
Advanced interdisciplinary 
research type 2 
Non-legal questions Advanced interdisciplinary 
research type 1 
Advanced interdisciplinary 
research type 3 
Fig. 2: Taxonomy of interdisciplinary legal research (Siems, 2009) 
 
Siems argues that the advantage of the first type of advanced interdisciplinary legal research is that it can 
provide a relatively comprehensive view of a particular topic. It avoids the trap of focusing on only one 
piece of the jigsaw and disregarding other important interconnected issues.125   The second and third type 
of interdisciplinary research involve the introduction of ’scientific’ methods, for instance empirical research.  
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Yet Siems warns that law is not science in the sense of constructing models in order to test hypotheses.126   
It may be that ‘the legal world and its relationship with extra‐legal factors is too complex to be reduced to 
numbers.’127 This is because ‘an applicable legal norm on anything but the most banal question is likely to 
be complex, nuanced, contested. […] Law is not a datum; it is in constant evolution, developing in ways 
that are sometimes startling and endlessly inventive.’128   Publications 2, 3, 8 and 11 include aspects of 
Siems’ advanced interdisciplinary research types, in exploration of non-legal as well as legal issues, 
collaboration with researchers outside the legal discipline and the use of methods (empirical analysis of 
freedom of information and survey responses, and participatory research with results analysed following an 
inductive grounded theory approach) not common in legal research.   
 
Doctrinal research has however been paralleled to discovery in sciences: ‘Doctrinal research, at its best, 
involves rigorous analysis and creative synthesis, the making of connections between seemingly disparate 
doctrinal research strands, and the challenge of extracting general principles from an inchoate mass of 
primary materials’, a blend of deduction and induction and analogy.129  This is especially so since doctrinal 
research reflects a positivist approach where the law is seen as neutral and objective.  Regarding the law 
as ’data’, however, overlooks the importance of context and that interpreting and applying the law is highly 
subjective130 (explaining why lawyers spend so much time arguing!).  
 
Taekema and Burg point out that as doctrinal analysis ‘is usually restricted to one legal order at a specific 
moment in its historical development, it does not yield generalisable results, let alone general theories.’131   
They propose an integrated approach - ‘interdisciplinary doctrinal research’ - and argue that ‘there is no 
such thing as purely monodisciplinary doctrinal analysis.’  They posit that legal doctrinal research ’cannot 
be other than interdisciplinary in nature.’  Critical evaluation and reform proposals ’require at least some 
critical distance regarding the legal order‘, consideration of the society in which the law exists and the 
behaviour that it regulates, and the inclusion of insights from other disciplines.132    
 
They distinguish between five different ways of interdisciplinary research and their purposes as laid out in 
Fig. 3. 
 
Type of interdisciplinary research  Purpose 
1. Heuristics  The second discipline is used to stimulate creativity and 
to obtain new ideas 
2. Auxiliary discipline  The second discipline provides data and input, for 
example sociological insights about effectiveness or 
economic insights about efficiency 
3. Interdisciplinary comparative research  Two parallel but separate projects – for example, a legal 
and an ethical one – on the same issue, with parallel 
questions and methods and a comparison at the end 
4. Dialectical cooperation Two separate disciplinary projects interact throughout 
the research process, enabling researchers to 
continuously adjust and refine their research 
5. Integrated research The most challenging and the ultimate aim of Taekema 
and Burg’s ‘interdisciplinary doctrinal research’ in order 
to construct, evaluate and reform legal doctrine 
Fig. 3. Types and purposes of interdisciplinary research, Taekema and Burg (2015) 
 
Within the Work, examples of the first and second ways of interdisciplinary research can be seen, for 
instance with developments in criminology and data science both providing the basis for the case study 
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critiqued in publication 6, and providing insight and contribution to the output.  Integrated research was 
attempted in publications 2 and 3 although I would not classify these publications as ‘interdisciplinary 
doctrinal’.  The aim of these pieces of research was wider than doctrinal analysis and in particular to the 
inform the structure and application of the law by developing an understanding of the challenges and issues 
faced by those at the ‘coal face.’  
 
Roux disagrees with the view that legal research is an inherently interdisciplinary discipline.133 Doctrinal 
research, Roux argues, ’characteristically draws on other disciplines to improve the rational coherence and 
social efficacy of law. Provided doctrinal researchers respect the conventionally accepted reasoning 
techniques of the legal tradition in which they are working, there is no reason why such research should be 
regarded as interdisciplinary.’  It is open to the doctrinal researcher to use knowledge from another 
discipline, but with ’primary fidelity‘ to the purposes of the legal tradition; in other words, doctrinal 
researchers are ‘expert cannibalisers’ of knowledge from other disciplines.  In some respects, I would 
recognise myself in this cannibalistic description.  I would however frame the process in a more positive 
manner in terms of the need to work across legal and disciplinary boundaries in order to identify and 
incorporate relevant information and tackle those ’known unknowns’.  
 
Legal research in the wider sense, says Roux, can be regarded as a multidisciplinary field ’in which 
doctrinal research is but one of many mono-disciplinary and interdisciplinary forms of research being 
pursued.’  It is questionable therefore whether legal research can be thought of as a discipline, in the sense 
of having a limited and defined set of methodological standards and audiences.  The Work includes jointly 
written pieces (9 and 10) where the authors, although all from a legal background, approach the research 
from different areas of expertise and different experiences (academic or practice), thus making links 
between often disparate and siloed academic ‘subjects’ and research strands to propose a more coherent 
approach to legal principle.   
 
Schrama’s definition of interdisciplinary legal research is a considerably more straightforward one: ‘legal 
research which incorporates insights from non-legal disciplines.’134  It concerns the external effectiveness of 
the law and thus the law in action, evaluating the difference between ‘the legal reality and the real reality’ 
with the method determined by the nature of the research question.135  Schrama argues that ‘at least two 
different goals may be discerned: to give context to a legal problem or to test a specific legal approach as 
to its external effectiveness.’136  She further suggests two main routes: ‘unilateral’ where a legal research 
question is investigated by a legal researcher but using data from another discipline; and ‘multilateral’ 
where the project, from the start, involves at least two researchers from different disciplines.137   Again, the 
Work has involved both these approaches.  A key challenge is how to assess the non-legal data in order to 
judge the implications about the legal reality: Schrama asks, ‘when does an external argument result in a 
necessity to change the law?...The external argument will have to be transformed into an internal argument 
and then to be weighed against the other arguments.’138   The Work has also used an interdisciplinary 
approach to assess whether the law is understood or being applied effectively by those subject to it. 
 
I identify with many of the problems of interdisciplinary legal research laid out in the literature, in particular 
the accusation of ‘picking and choosing’ and thus incorrectly understanding the other discipline, the 
challenge of how to integrate empirical results within the legal discipline, lack of knowledge of 
quantitative/qualitative methods (which I have tried to address by personal training and the use of research 
assistance with such expertise) and difficulties in translating legal concepts.139  As Buchanan and Headrick 
point out, interdisciplinary work between lawyers and computer/data scientists comes with a risk of talking 
at cross-purposes, with words and concepts having different meanings in each discipline (as I discuss in 
 
133 Theunis Robert Roux, ‘The Incorporation Problem in Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Some Conceptual Issues 
and a Practical Illustration’ (2015) Erasmus Law Review 2, 39-42. 
134 Wendy Schrama, ‘How to carry out interdisciplinary legal research: Some experiences with an interdisciplinary 
research method’ (2011) Utrecht Law Review 7(1) 147–162, 147.  
135 Ibid, 149.  
136 n134, 161.  
137 n134, 151-152. 
138 n134, 160. 





publication 5): ‘computer scientists…have operated with a conception of law as a collection of facts and 
“correct” legal principles; they have assumed that the computer can be most helpful to the lawyer if it can 
retrieve the right answers quickly. But the lawyer rarely looks for, or even expects, clear answers. More 
often than not, he searches his data base…in order to construct legally acceptable arguments in the pursuit 
of one or more objectives.’140    
 
Furthermore, it is certainly the case that, despite the promotion of interdisciplinary work within funding calls 
and ’impact’ assessments, University and academic research structures, in particular the separation of 
disciplines into silos, can act against successful interdisciplinary integration.  Ultimately, however, I would 
agree with van Klink and Taekema that we should adopt a pragmatic view on the differences between law 
and other academic fields, as the advantages of mixing can outweigh a formalistic strict separation.141   
There can be no one-size-fits-all approach to interdisciplinary research.  Projects and activities will require 
differing levels of disciplinary integration (from knowledge sourcing to jointly combining approaches) but, 
crucially in order to have the best chance of success, with common aims.  The approach that I have 
adopted - interdisciplinarity combined with the methodologies discussed in section 3 - are no doubt familiar 
to many legal researchers with a practice background and could be described as an ‘in-house’ approach to 
legal research.  This approach is defined by practical knowledge of an operational context built up through 
deep interaction with that context, awareness of relevant legal frameworks (including the ’known 
unknowns’), translation of theoretical concepts for such operational contexts, and the independence 
necessary to produce robust conclusions and recommendations from such comprehensive understanding, 
which then feed back into the operational context.  It is a research approach that I would suggest is worthy 
of further consideration and development within academia.   
5. Progression of the research 
 
The research has continued in 2020 culminating in the following publications. The themes explored in 2 and 
3 have been further developed in a final project report in which the full findings of the participatory research 
process informed extensive practical recommendations directed at police forces, regulators and software 
developers.142  The report advised inter alia that algorithmic outputs should be treated as a form of 
intelligence associated with a level of confidence, thus driving human users to assess the validity and 
relevance of the information.143  This conclusion has been of direct relevance to a national policing project 
that has been reviewed by the West Midlands Police data ethics committee, resulting in a change to the 
tool’s operation and design.   
 
Continuing the theme of the public sector use of AI, a forthcoming book chapter uses a doctrinal approach 
to draw attention – in the context of predictive tools being deployed to support the police’s public protection 
functions - to the difficulties of reliance upon a common law legal basis, an issue also highlighted by the 
Bridges decision in the context of live facial recognition.144  We conclude that the roles and responsibilities 
of the police of England and Wales may need to be explicitly defined in the form of statutory functions, as is 
the case with the police services of Scotland and Northern Ireland, not just in respect of police use of 
algorithms, but to provide reassurances regarding the legitimacy of the ‘public protection’ and preventative 
functions of the police.145  In addition, the participatory research methodology and interdisciplinary 
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approach used successfully in 2 and 3 was deployed again in the research for and production of a peer-
reviewed report on AI and national security commissioned by GCHQ.146 
 
The concept of ‘experimental proportionality’, first posited in 6, is revisited in an analysis piece forthcoming 
in Public Law in the context of the English Covid-19 contact tracing app.147  In the uncertainty of the 
coronavirus pandemic, it is difficult to determine the impact on rights and benefits for society of the data 
driven solutions deployed or proposed (an issue that was also raised in 11).  We argue that, combined with 
a robust and rolling oversight function, a model of 'experimental' proportionality review could assist in 
upholding a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community in situations 
of uncertainty and crisis.  This piece contributes to the increasingly important body of work that promotes 
administrative law principles as providing a systematic (and less individualistic compared to data protection 
law) constraint on the use of algorithmic decision-making by public bodies, as I discuss in 5.  Daly, for 
instance, argues that the Ofqual grading algorithm ‘could lead to systemic unfairness in the sense that the 
algorithm “creates a real risk of a more than minimal number” of irrational decisions (R (BF (Eritrea)) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 872, [2020] 4 WLR 38, [63] (Underhill 
LJ).’148 
 
My ‘interdisciplinary’ work within law has also continued, with the development of a new collaboration with 
Kotsoglou.  Together we commented upon the High Court decision in Bridges, critiquing the court’s 
conclusion that live facial recognition was ‘no more intrusive than the use of CCTV on the streets’ and 
arguing that insufficient attention was paid to particular decision-making contexts in which facial recognition 
could be deployed.149   In this respect, it was somewhat satisfying to note the Court of Appeal’s conclusion 
that ’The fundamental deficiencies, as we see it, in the legal framework currently in place relate to two 
areas of concern. The first is what was called the “who question” at the hearing before us. The second is 
the “where question”. In relation to both of those questions too much discretion is currently left to individual 
police officers.’150   Again in collaboration with Kotsoglou, I have built on the research and conclusions in 4 
to explore the increasing use of the polygraph in the current English penal system, including Bills before 
Parliament providing for the use of the polygraph in the monitoring of terrorism and domestic violence 
offenders.  This project has used in part a freedom of information methodology which has highlighted a 
concerning lack of consistency in both practice and procedure in respect of the use of the polygraph by 
police forces, including the uncovering of a non-statutory imposition of the polygraph test in connection with 
bail and a community sentence programme.151 
 
A few thoughts to conclude this section on further avenues of research suggested by the Work.  First, 
responsibilities and liabilities of internet intermediaries, or platforms as they are now more commonly 
called.  As Edwards argues, ‘The dawning horror at [the] covert manipulation of everything from buying 
choices to democratic decision making may have finally killed off once and for all the notion of platforms as 
innocent intermediaries.’152  Despite this, Mac Sithigh’s view is that the fragmented approach to the law on 
intermediaries has continued and that new approaches are emerging,153  bringing with them ’a number of 
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design and implementation dilemmas’ including finding the right balance between judicial resolution of 
disputes and a regulatory approach.154    
 
In 1, I argued that ’harmful data processing needs to be addressed head-on, and this may mean dealing 
with problems in more than one place in the information lifecycle.’ (1 at page 112).  I continue to stand by 
this view.  With such continuing ’horrors’ as the mainstreaming of deepfake porn,155 the alleged profiling of 
Black Americans on Facebook by the Trump campaign,156 and the ’surveillant on the street’ (as coined in 1) 
now a reality thanks to DIY facial recognition systems,157  it could be time to revisit the 2017 ’misuse of the 
digital person’ model proposed in 7.  Rather than attempting to hide information already in the public 
domain, this model focuses upon ’how an individual might be protected from inappropriate intrusion based 
on the exploitation of this information to de-anonymise, make links or generate presumptions.’  The model 
would apply to digital information that represented the fundamentals of a person (Fig. 4), permitting only 
certain actions in respect of that information.  I suggested that ’discernible digital information that falls within 
the fundamentals of a person (for instance, a blog in which a person expresses their views and talks about 
their life) can [in this model] be viewed, read, searched, stored, linked to and reported upon, but not further 
used (unless an exception applied) to generate new information or intelligence about an individual that falls 
within the fundamentals of a person’ (7 at page 23). 
  
Fig. 4. Fundamentals of a digital person as proposed in 7 at page 23 
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Although my proposal considered tort law as a framework, on reflection it was proposing new duties (rather 
than enforcement of existing laws) applicable to all but addressed through intermediaries.  I remain 
uncertain as to whether the proposal is at all realistic in a society where we continue to ‘amuse ourselves to 
death’, and the acceptability of intrusion or surveillance activities differs dependent upon context and 
jurisdiction.  But as Brownsword says: ‘Coherentists might make heroic attempts to apply the existing rules, 
to make the existing rules fit, but sooner or later the disruption will have to be addressed head-on and a 
bespoke regulatory response made.’158   He further argues that if we are not ready to accept that privacy is 
dead, we need a ‘fixed conception...to make the protective regime more robust by anchoring the ubiquitous 
idea of a reasonable expectation.‘159  Might the misuse of the digital person model be adapted for a 'fixed’ 
response to some of the most egregious digital harms, and thus influence the technical design of products, 
services and processes? 
 
Furthermore, I would like to return to questions of freedom of information that were explored in part in 13 
and in practice by use of freedom of information request methodology.  Parallel lines of cases have 
considered the question of whether Article 10 ECHR, which includes a right ‘to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority’, therefore creates a right to request 
information from a public authority where refusal would constitute interference with Article 10.  It can but it 
depends, the ECtHR has said, ‘in circumstances where access to the information is instrumental for the 
individual’s exercise of his or her right to freedom of expression’.160  The Supreme Court has taken a 
different stance; Article 10 does not create a positive duty of disclosure on public authorities,161 and 
therefore Article 10 does not create a right in English law to request and receive information from public 
bodies, nor does it impact upon the terms of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.162  Knowledge that 
affects exercise of rights – for instance that might expose electoral influence or manipulation – is however 
increasingly in the hands of commercial bodies, as are records and knowledge crucial for the preservation 
of cultural memory longer term.  Ovenden asks: ’Since the digital shift has been driven by a relatively small 
number of powerful technology companies, who will be responsible for the control of history and for 
preserving society’s memory?’163  What should be the role of public libraries and archives in taking control 
of these digital bodies of knowledge and so providing us with the means of examining how the world ’has 
come to be the way it is’164 and enabling understanding of the issues at stake. The Digital Economy Act 
2017 confers a power on the Statistics Board to require the disclosure of information held by non-public 
commercial undertakings,165 thus taking a tentative step towards combining privately held data with public 
sector information for the purposes of official statistics.  We seem to be a long way off however from 
deciding if and how commercially-held digital data should be regarded as part of ’society’s memory’ and 
how far individuals, public bodies or regulators should be able to access or archive such data for of 
important societal purposes, rather than in pursuance of individuals rights or complaints.   
 
In relation to the use of algorithmic technologies by the public sector, it appears that, despite regular calls 
for regulation or legislation,166 in practice the current political and operational environment is one that 
favours self-regulation and ‘ethical’ guidance (and this has been influenced strongly by some academic 
groupings), rather than approaches based on law and mandatory regulation that have consequences and 
red lines.  A plethora of ethical guidelines and frameworks have emerged, both at a national and 
international level,167 satisfying on the surface the ’something must be done’ requirement but providing little 
or no consistency or firm protection.  It is concerning, for instance, that in the Government Digital Service’s 
most recent Data Ethics Framework, ’comply with the law’ only comes in at number 3 on the list of 
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160 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary, App. No. 18030/11 (8 November 2016), 156. 
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https://www.wired.co.uk/article/regulate-facial-recognition-laws.  
167 Some of which are highlighted in the Annex to Alexander Babuta, Marion Oswald, Ardi Janjeva, ’Artificial 





actions!168  Statements and questions such as ’define the public benefit’ and ’How does the design and 
implementation of the project or algorithm respect human rights and democratic values?’ evidence little real 
understanding of the necessity and proportionality tests in human rights law, both in respect of the design 
of a digital tool and to its deployment in an operational context.  I appreciate that by chairing a body 
described as a data ethics committee, I could be accused of contributing to the problem.  Ultimately, if the 
police force chose not to follow the committee’s advice, the only immediate consequence would be 
reputational damage.  However, my research has informed both the committee’s terms of reference and the 
way that it operates, with law sitting at number 1 on the list.  ’Algocare’ is used to structure submissions to 
the committee, and various findings from the Work and subsequent research have informed advice 
provided on the design and ’operationalisation’ of data analytics.  This integration with the operational 
environment is, I would suggest, an example of the ’in house’ legal research approach mentioned above. I 
intend to continue to champion the application of ‘old’ law to the deployment of new technologies by the 
State, the translation and reimagining of underlying principles to new contexts and where necessary, the 
need for new frameworks and forms of regulation. 
6. General evaluation statement and conclusion  
 
The process of preparing this Commentary has been a revealing and illuminating one, enabling me to 
revisit the issues and themes explored within the Work and to reconsider the methodologies and 
interdisciplinary nature of the research.  I aim to have demonstrated that the Work has made a coherent, 
valuable and original contribution to knowledge in the field of Cyberlaw, and specifically within the overall 
theme and three sub-themes identified, and that the Work has led to further avenues of academic 
investigation as well as to practical and policy developments.  In bringing practice experience into the 
academic field, I have developed mixed methods methodologies that make ‘the best of both worlds’ and 
have translated academic theories and legal principles into operational environments.  Technological 
change has been a consistent theme through my varied career, whether as a user, adviser and now as a 
researcher. There is no doubt that this technological change will continue throughout the 2020s and 
beyond, and I hope to continue to contribute in a small way to considering how the law should deal with it. 
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